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VASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
certainties involved in this area, it is hoped that the court will have
occasion to review the questions here presented and clarify its position
on these issues. JOHN H. BiNNs JR.
Interspousal Actions-Personal Torts. In Goode v. Martinis,' the
Washington Supreme Court held that a wife has a cause of action in
tort for an assault committed upon her by her husband while the parties
are legally separated and divorce proceedings are pending. While re-
stricting its holdings to the particular facts, the court rejected the
rationale advanced in favor of the common law doctrine of spousal
disability.'
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint alleged the
following facts. On the evening of January 9, 1958, Paul V. Martinis
entered the residence of the plaintiff, Edna V. Goode, his wife, and
assaulted her by forcibly having sexual intercourse with her against
her will. The assault occurred approximately eight weeks after the
parties had separated. However, it was not until almost six weeks after
the alleged assault that a divorce action was tried and a final divorce
decree awarded.
On appeal the court held that the leading Washington case on inter-
spousal personal torts action, Schultz v. Christopher,' was not con-
trolling because of the narrow purpose of the statute" upon which the
holding was based. The court recognized the existence of three statutes'
which make reference to the right of spouses to maintain actions in
their individual capacity. The court did not construe the aggregate
effect of these statutes upon abrogation of the common law doctrine of
spousal disability. However the tenor of the opinion manifests serious
1158 Wash. Dec. 222, 361 P.2d 941 (1961).
2 Id at 226, 361 P.2d at 944-45.
3 65 Wash. 496,118 P. 629 (1911).
4 RCW 26.16.160, providing that "All laws which impose or recognize civil disabili-
ties upon a wife, which are not imposed or recognized as existing as to the husband, are
hereby abolished, and for any unjust usurpation of her natural or property rights, she
shall have the same right to appeal in her own individual name, to the courts of law
or equity for redress and protection that the husband has: Provided always, That
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to confer upon the wife any right to vote or
hold office, except as otherwise provided by law."
; RCW 26.16.130, providing that "A wife may receive the wages of her personal
labor and maintain an action therefor in her own name and hold the same in her own
right, and she may prosecute and defend all actions at law for the preservation and
protection of her rights and property rights as if unmarried." RCW 26.16.150, pro-
viding that 'Every married person shall hereafter have the same right and liberty to
acquire, hold, enjoy and dispose of every species of property, and to sue and be sued,
as if he or she were unmarried." RCW 26.16.160, supra note 4.
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doubt as to the continued existence of the doctrine in the light of these
statutes and the meritless rationale upon which the doctrine is based.
A right of action in tort between spouses has received recognition in
only a few jurisdictions,' though favored by writers7 upon the subject.
In Schultz' the court held that since the husband at common law had
no right to sue his wife, correspondingly the wife had no right to sue her
husband under the married woman's emancipation statute. The court
construed RCW 26.16.160,1 the married woman's emancipation statute,
as only abolishing the tyranny of sex. This result merely places the
husband and wife upon an equal footing10 The court reasoned that
since the husband, at common law or under this statute, did not have a
right to sue his wife in tort, it is plain that the wife has been given no
such right. The court went on to say that there may be reasons why a
spouse should have the right to sue the other for damages in tort but
that such a right must be conferred by legislative authority.
The Schultz case only concerned the effect of the married woman's
emancipation statute. What is the effect of an aggregate construc-
tion of RCW 26.16.1301" and RCW 26.16.15012 in conjunction with
RCW 26.16.160 upon the doctrine of spousal disability? Although the
total effect of these statutes has not been determined by the court, it
appears that their provisions, if liberally construed, 3 would afford a
right of action in tort between spouses. RCW 26.16.150 expressly
provides that every married person shall have the right to sue and be
sued, as if he or she were unmarried. It is obviously the plain import
of that provision to give both the husband and wife the right to sue
as if unmarried. This provision apparently eliminates the effect of
Schultz v. Christopher."
It has been argued in other jurisdictions that a statute such as RCW
26.16.150 pertains merely to property and does not expressly provide
for a tort remedy. Why should a wife be able to sue her husband for
6 See 43 ALR2d 632 for majority and minority positions.
7 McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030(1930); McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 Vim.. L. REv. 303(1959) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 674 (2d ed. 1955) ; Haghmd, Tort Actions Between Husband
and Wife, 27 GEo. L. J. 697 (1939).
8 Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911).
9 Quoted at note 4 supra.
10 Rosencrantz v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 267, 5 Pac. 305 (1884).
11 Quoted at note 5 supra.
3. Quoted at note 5 supra.
'1 RCW 1.12.010 provides: "The provisions of this code shall be liberally construed
and shall not be limited by any rule of strict construction."
14 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911).
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breach of contract 5 or for conversion of her personal property"0 and
at the same time not be able to sue him for a malicious and wilful tort? 7
Some courts have recognized this apparent inconsistency in the applica-
tion of such statutes and have stretched their analytical approach to
allow recovery for a personal tort. This result has been accomplished
by reason that the wife has an inchoate chose in action arising from the
injury inflicted by her husband's act. This tort action then comes
within the scope of alleged property statute. 8 The better reasoned
cases 9 hold that statutes such as RCW 26.16.130, 150, and 160 should
be construed liberally.
The effect of these statutes has been to emancipate the wife from
her common law inability to own, control, and manage her separate
property. In additon, they have emancipated her from her inability to
sue and be sued for the protection of her property and personal rights.
Since the reason for the wife's disability and lack of rights has been
completely eliminated, it is logical that the better reasoned cases hold
her disability and loss of rights to have completely disappeared with
the common law fiction that the husband and wife are one.20 Thus
there is now no need for an express statutory provision declaring that
marriage does not disable spouses from suing one another in tort.21
The legislature has intended to establish the separate identity of the
husband and wife in all property and personal rights as if they were
2
5 In Mattinson v. Mattinson, 128 Wash. 328, 222 Pac. 620 (1924), the court held
that there is no reason why the wife should not be permitted to bring an action to
recover the amount loaned from her separate funds to her husband and to secure judg-
ment against her husband personally. The court, citing RCW 26.16.150, recognizes
that she may sue and be sued, as if unmarried. See Kimble v. Kimble, 17 Wash. 75, 49
Pac. 216 (1897), which held that a wife may sue her husband for fraud.
16Walker v. Walker, 215 Ky. 154, 284 S.W. 1042 (1926) (statute similar to RCW
26.16.150.)
'7 See Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 At. 889 (1914); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68
S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941).
18 See Curtis v. Wilcox [1948] 2 K.B. 474 (antenuptial tort); Koplik v. C. P.
Trucking Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 196, 135 A.2d 555 (1957) (antenuptial tort).
19 Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952) ; Scot-
vold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941) ; Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla.
395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917) ; Gilman
v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 AUt. 657 (1916) ; Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889(1914).
20 See Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wn2d 419, 424, 275 P.2d 723, 725 (1954). The
court states that the basis of the spousal disability doctrine is based upon the "supposed"
unity of the husband and wife. This language indicates that the Washington court is not
sure of the continued existence of this unity in the light of RCW 26.16.130, 150, and 160.
21 Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E2d 337 (1952). See
also, Beach v. Brown, 20 Wash. 266, 55 Pac. 46 (1898), holding that an investigation
of the statutes in relation to the rights of married women shows that in all cases where
exceptions are intended they are provided expressly by statute.
1962]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
unmarried. These statutes are remedial in nature and should be con-
strued liberally to give a remedy where there is a wrong.22
It may be questioned if such a suit could be maintained in the State
of Washington. There is no procedural impediment to the maintenance
of a suit between spouses. 3 RCW 5.60.060 (1) provides that a spouse
may be examined as a witness against her husband in either a civil or
criminal proceeding.2" The court does not appear to be concerned about
whether the damages recovered would be community or separate prop-
erty. It has held that such a consideration has no bearing upon the
ability of the spouse to sue for such damages. 5
Therefore, it appears that there is no longer any procedual or sub-
stantive impediment to give full effect to RCW 26.16.130, 150, and 160.
If such statutes are taken at face value there is no reason why they
cannot be construed to give a wife cause of action in tort against her
husband.
However, a majority of courts follow the common law doctrine of
spousal disability for the following reasons. (1) The common law doc-
trine rests upon the premise that the husband and wife are one, hence,
they could not maintain an action against one another. However, the
common law allowed one spouse to criminally prosecute another.
(2) Another argument advanced is that the wife is legally incapaci-
tated to sue her husband as a matter of public policy. To permit such
an action would be to disrupt the marital harmony. However, it seems
that a criminal prosecution would disrupt the marital harmony just as
22 Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Old. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938). See also, State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Seattle Gas & Elect Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 Pac. 946 (1902), which
states that the rule in construing statutes, though they may be in derogation of the
common law, is that everything is to be done in advancement of the remedy that can be
done consistently with any fair construction that can be put upon it.
23 RCW 4.08.030 provides: "When a married woman is a party her husband must
be joined with her, except:... (2) when the action is between herself and her husband,
she may sue or be sued alone." (Emphasis added.)
24 RCW 5.60.060 provides: "The following persons shall not be examined as wit-
nesses: (1) A husband shall not be examined for or against the wife, without consent
of the wife or a wife shall not be examined for or against the husband, without consent
of the husband; nor can either during marriage or afterward, be without the consent of
the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other during marriage.
But this exception shall not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the
other, nor to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the
other."
25In Stevens v. Depue, 151 Wash. 641, 276 Pac. 882 (1929), the court held that the
wife had the right to sue alone for damages for alienation of affections, regardless of
whether such damages, when recovered, would become community or separate property.
The court stated, "Whether, when recovered, the damages will belong to her or the
community is immaterial to us. Since she had the right to sue for damages alone, she
has the concomitant sole right to satisfy and discharge any judgment in her favor."
The court recognized that RCW 26.16.150 and 160 gave her such a right.
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much as a civil action." Also, it is difficult to see how an action for
personal injuries would disrupt marital harmony any more than an
action for damage to property, which is permissible under the Married
Women's Statutes."
(3) A spouse can get adequate relief for past misconduct by institu-
tion of criminal or divorce proceedings. But these proceedings do not
afford compensation for the wrong incurred. They merely prevent
future wrongs.28 It is questionable whether they accomplish that result.
(4) Another factor advanced in support of the common law doctrine
is, if the wife could recover in tort from her husband it would lead to
collusion and fraud against insurance companies. However, there is
no more opportunity for fraud in a tort action than in actions permitted
between husband and wife. This line of argument pre-supposes that
the court are so ineffectual and the jury system so imperfect that fraud-
ulent claims would not be recognized. Such an argument is an insult
to the integrity and competence of our court system.2 9
(5) It has also been advanced that permitting litigation between hus-
band and wife would flood the courts with trivial lawsuits. This objec-
tion has turned out to be merely another theoretical possibility which
in practicality has not materialized."0
In the past decade the Washington court has shown an increasing wil-
lingness to overturn court-made tort law." In Borst v. Borst,82 a child
was allowed to recover from his parent in tort, despite the common law
provision for parental immunity from suit by the child. The court in
Borst answered the argument that the court should wait for legislative
sanction for such an action, stating that the true role of the legislature
is to restrict liability if it chooses to do so," but, "where the proposal
is to open the doors of the court, rather than to close them, the courts
26 See, Steele v. Steele, 65 F.Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946) ; Fieldeer v. Fieldeer, 42 Okl.
124,140 Pac. 1022 (1914).
2' Brown v. Goser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953). See cases cited at notes 18 & 19
supra.
28 Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okl. 395, 87 P2d 660 (1938) ; Crowell v. Crowell, 180
N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917).
20 Brown v. Goser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
30 Goode v. Martinis, 158 Wash. Dec. 222, 361 P.2d 941 (1961).
32 See cases cited at 43 ALR2d 632.
32 41 Wn. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). See also, Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349,
102 N.E2d 691 (1951), which held that a court would abdicate its own function, in a
field peculiarly nonstatutory, if it refused to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-
made rule.
33 See, Brandt v. Keller, 413 II. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952). Notice the effect of
its holding that a wife may recover from her husband in an action for tort upon the law
in Illinois as subsequently enacted and applied in Hindman v. Holmes, 4 Ill. App. 2d
279, 124 N.E.2d 344 (1955).
1962]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
are quite competent to act for themselves."" In Pierce v. Yakima Val-
ley Memorial Hospital Assocaiion,5 the court reversed the common
law proposition that charitable hospitals are immune from tort actions.
The court stated: "The factors upon which any public policy is based
-the relevant factual situation and the thinking of the times-are not
static. They change as conditions change and as ways of looking at
things change. 3 6
The day of the spousal immunity doctrine is waning. Justice Cor-
dozo said, "The inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's end.
The law, like the traveler must be ready for the morrow."" There is,
and never has been any statute in England or in Washington declaring
the "oneness" of husband and wife. It was an inference drawn by
courts in a barbarous age, based on the wife's being treated as a
chattel without any right to property or person. It has always been
disregarded by courts of equity. Public opinion as expressed by all
subsequent laws and constitutional" provisions has been against it.
The anomalous instances of oneness which still survive are due to the
courts having restricted or construed away changes made through cor-
rective legislation.
Whether a man has laid open his wife's head with a bludgeon, put out
her eye, broken her arm or poisoned her body, he is no longer exempt
from liability to her on the ground that he vowed at the altar to "love,
cherish and protect" her. We have progressed that far in civilization
and justice. Never again will "the sun go back ten degrees on the dial
of Ahaz."3 9
The status of women in today's society has completely changed since
the common law doctrine was formulated. They are no longer thought
of as chattels, subservient to every wish and command of their husband.
It is recognized that when the woman takes her wedding vows certain
confidential relationships40 and ordinary frictions of wedlock must be
34 41 Wn.2d at 657,251 P.2d at 157.
85 43 Wn.2d 162,260 P.2d 765 (1953).
36 Id. at 166, 260 P,2d at 767, 768.
37Steele v. Steele 65 F.Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946), quoting CARnozo, THE GROWTH
OF THE LAW, 20.38 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides: "No
law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than
municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong
to all citizens or corporations." See also, Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Old. 395, 87 P.2d
660, 667 (1938).
39 Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920).
40 See, Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn.2d 851, 272 P.2d 125 (1954). See also, note,
TORT AcTIoNs BETWEEN HusBAND AND Wm_, 9 CLEv.-MAP. L. Rav. 265 (1960).
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accepted, but the fact of marriage should not mean wholesale destruc-
tion of individual liberty and rights. There is no compelling reason why
a wife should not be afforded the right to sue her husband for a mali-
cious and wilful tort. The day has come when Cardozo's traveler must
again arise and continue on his journey.
RIcHARD H. WnLir s
Landowner's Liability to Servants of Independent Contractor.
In Murk v. Aronsen the Washington Supreme Court had occasion to
consider a landowner's tort liability where work is placed under the
control of an independent contractor. In a 5-to-4 decision the court
held that an owner is not liable to a contractor's servant injured by the
negligence of a contractor who has control of the premises. By its deci-
sion the court has reaffirmed its earlier position,' despite a trend toward
expanding the exceptions to the rule of non-liability for torts of inde-
pendent contractors.3
The Congregation Bikur Cholim had employed the Aronsens as
caterers to prepare and serve a banquet at the synagogue. The Aron-
sens, during the course of the preparation, serving and clean-up were
given complete control of the kitchen and were not supervised by the
synagogue. The Aronsens also provided their own employees, one of
whom was the plaintiff, Ebba Murk.
While dinner was being prepared Louis Aronsen spilled cooking
grease on the floor. Although the slippery condition of the floor was
called to his attention nothing was done about it. Later in the evening
Murk walked past the stove, slipped on the grease and was injured. She
brought suit against both the Congregation and the Aronsens. A judg-
ment was directed against the Aronsens but the suit against the syna-
gogue was dismissed.
In affirming the dismissal of the suit against the synagogue, the
majority based its decision upon the factors of control and duty. It
recognized that the principal employer owes a duty to the servants of
his independent contractor not to injure them by his own negligence.4
However, when the servant is injured solely through the negligence of
157 Wn2d 785, 359 P2d 816 (1961).
2 Campbell v. Jones, 60 Wash. 265, 110 Pac. 1083 (1910).
3 Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 IiL. L. REv. 339, 345 (1934).
"It is believed that the apparently expanding exceptions to the traditional rule of insula-
tion indicate that the law is headed that direction."
4 Construction company held liable to the employees of an independent contractor for
injuries resulting from the company's negligence in providing a defective scaffold to be
used by the employees. Bowen v. Smyth, 68 Wash. 513, 123 Pac. 1016 (1912).
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